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Abstract 
We contribute to the aid-development debate by investigating how official development 
assistance shapes the ability of developing countries to efficiently utilise their demographic 
capital. We measure the effect of aggregated and sectoral disaggregated foreign aid on the 
Human Development Index and other social indicators for 139 developing countries from 1995 
to 2014. Our results provide robust evidence against the development effects of aid. The prior 
effects are robust regardless of the level of working age population in the recipient country and 
after removing the biases of aid aggregation. In light of these findings, we introduce a new 
setting for aid disbursements that aims to resolve common pitfalls and improve the efficacy of 
existing systems. 
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1. Introduction 
After 70 years of Official Development Assistance (ODA), today it is believed that this tool is 
misused, badly targeted, and weakly linked to human development (Williamson, 2008; United 
Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2004). As shown in Figure 1, aid flows have been 
increasing with a steady and slow pace since the 1990s, reaching its highest value of 189 billion 
US$ in 2013. The current hike in aid is matched with attaining the largest ratio of working age 
population (age 15–64) to world population around 60% (7.2 billion) reaching a historic high 
record, with the majority residing in developing countries (World Bank, 2016; United Nations 
Population Fund [UNFP], 2015). 
 Figure 1: working age population (% total population) and aid flows (millions US$), (1995–
2014) 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], (2015) and World Bank, (2016) 
 
It is estimated that about 1 billion poor people live in developing countries on ≤1.25 US$ a day 
in 2014; this compares to 1.36 billion in 2005, and 1.91 billion in 1990. These numbers reveal 
the slight progress in reducing poverty levels in spite of the immense aid flows (World Bank, 
2016; Food and Agricultural Organization [FAO], 2014). Additionally, the FAO estimates that 
almost all the hungry people, around 13.5% of the world population, live in developing countries 
(FAO, 2014).  
 
The ability of developing countries to reap the benefits of their young working age population is 
not always attained. The key determinants of whether a country is able to utilise its demographic 
endowment are the flexibility of the economy and the presence of proper and effectively 
implemented educational and social safety policies (Bloom and Canning, 2003). According to 
Bloom and Canning (2003) and Bloom, et al., 2007) for the sake of a successful integration of 
the nation‘s demographic capital, the country needs a) flexible economy with less restrictive 
labour laws and generous social services that are able to absorb and utilise the extra labour 
suppliers; b) a solid educational system that fosters the ability of young generations to learn new 
skills, adapt to new circumstances, and contribute to the growth of industries and firms; andc) 
well-chosen and effective policies in areas of family planning that lower fertility rates to speed 
up the emergence of the demographic bulge.  
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 Our research opts to quantify the effects of foreign aid on developing countries‘ capabilities to 
create sound social and economic environments towards integration of their demographic capital. 
We challenge the key premise in earlier studies that the developmental effects of different aid 
flows are uniform (Radelet, 2008). Therefore, we disaggregate aid channelled via the four sectors 
that are tightly linked to utilisation and integration of the countries‘ working age population 
(Bloom and Canning, 2003; Bloom, 2005). These are the education, population policy, 
production, and social infrastructure sectors. Accordingly, we opt to evaluate both aggregate and 
sectoral-disaggregated aid effects on the Human Development Index (HDI) that captures a 
broader—compared to income measures—manifestation of the quality of human life for a group 
of 139 developing economies during 1995–2014.  
 
We follow Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly and Levine (2003) Bräutigam and Knack (2004) 
and others, and conditionalise the development effects of aid to the quality of governance and the 
policy environment in recipient countries. In turn, we control for Heritage‘s economic freedom 
index that reflects the degree of economic flexibility and the quality of pursued governance for 
realising favourable developmental effects of foreign aid.  
 
There is a large body of literature on assessing the income and growth effects of foreign aid 
flows (See Roodman, 2004 for a review of the literature) and few attempts focused on evaluating 
the human welfare effects of foreign aid (Boone, 1996; Nourou, 2014). However, most of these 
studies only examined aggregate aid, while hypothesising that different aid types have a similar 
impact on growth and development.  
 
Growing literature has examined the growth impact of disaggregated aid flows. Minoiu and 
Reddy (2009) were among the first to distinguish between developmental and non-
developmental aid based on the recipient sector. The authors found robust evidence that aid 
offered for development purposes (irrigation projects, rural roads, bridge, health clinics, and 
schools) have significant positive growth effects compared to aid offered for other purposes 
(politics, military, and budgetary support).  
 
Another attempt of disaggregating aid by the source was conducted by Masud and Yontcheva, 
(2005) who examined the social effects of two disaggregated sources of foreign aid, NGO and 
bilateral aid flows. They found that NGO flows have a higher robust positive development 
impact compared to bilateral flows.  
 
However, we depart from these studies by three fold. First, we investigate the development 
effects of aid instead of growth effects using HDI and other non-monetary social variables. 
Second, we analyse disaggregated aid that is channelled within those sectors that are essential for 
properly integrating the young working age population of developing countries and realise their 
demographic advantage. Third, we investigate whether the developmental impact of aid is 
influenced by the size of the working age population in the recipient country by including an 
interaction term between the working age population and aid variables.  
 
Our cross section ordinary least square (OLS), seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and panel 
Fixed Effects (FE) results are in line with Boone (1996), Williamson (2008), Hartford and Klein 
(2005), Heckelman and Knack (2008) and others, which indicate that aid is ineffective in 
influencing HDI, health, and education variables. However, we provide extra evidence that the 
sluggish social effects of aid remain regardless of the level of working age population in the 
recipient country, even when we disaggregate the channelled aid across selected sectors that 
promote a developing country‘s ability to utilise its demographic endowment.  
 
2. Foreign aid prospects 
In the past two decades, the debate of aid selectivity has intensified and gave rise to the approach 
of ―policy and poverty selectivity‖. This approach encourages donor communities to become 
more biased towards allocating aid to poor countries that have good economic governance. The 
growth impact of aid is limited when the policy environment is poor; on the contrary, it exercises 
a negative impact. While for countries with good policies, more aid seems to have a positive 
impact on growth; China in the 1980s, as well as Uganda and Vietnam in the 1990s are good 
examples (Dollar and Levin, 2006; Isham and Kaufmann, 1999).  
 
High aid levels channelled towards governments with clear development agendas could a) 
improve the quality of the civil service, b) remove low revenue constraints, c) strengthen 
domestic institutions, and d) provide financial resources, training, and technical assistance to 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of governance (Bräutigam and Knack 2004).  
 
Moreover, foreign aid can increase resources devoted to the improvement of labour productivity 
and quality of human capital by financing a wide range of public services like health, social 
infrastructure, and education. However, it is argued that aid is highly volatile; thus, higher aid-
dependence could bring in more volatility in the supply of these services (Nourou, 2014; Radelet, 
2008). Similarly, aid could lead to more inequality because corrupted government officials and 
other administrative agents could exercise large efforts in capturing ODA for their private 
benefits; in countries like Somalia, the dispute over controlling this financial assistance might 
initiate civil wars and induce political instability (Maren, 1997).  
 
According to Masud and Yontcheva (2005), as well as Redelet (2008), the literature has 
introduced three main reasons for the counter-cyclical effects of aid. First, misallocation of aid, 
wherein donors use different strategic and political criteria for aid allocation rather than 
promoting development and/or reducing poverty. Second, misusing of aid by means of poor 
quality of governance, corruption, and absence of a clear development agenda of recipient 
countries. Third, GDP growth is not the right measure for aid effectiveness. 
 
The majority of foreign aid literature focused exclusively on the macroeconomic impact of aid 
on economic growth, savings, and investment (Masud and Yontcheva, 2005). Early literature 
concluded that aid had no significant impact on growth, savings, or investment. On the contrary, 
it increases unproductive public consumption (Mosley, et al., 1992). Subsequently, Hadjimichael 
et al. (1995) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) postulated that this negative relation is not 
conclusive; rather it depends on the receiving countries‘ policies. 
 
Boone (1996) was the first to empirically investigate the non-monetary effects of foreign aid. He 
found no significant social impact of aid on basic indicators of human development, such as 
infant mortality, primary schooling ratios, and life expectancy during 1971–1990 for a large 
group of developing countries. Masud and Yontcheva (2005) followed Boone‘s approach; 
however, they assessed the social effects of NGOs compared to bilateral aid flows. They find 
that NGO aid reduces infant mortality more effectively than official bilateral aid while its impact 
on illiteracy was less significant for 58 developing countries during 1990–2001.  
 
Gomanee et al. (2005) reported the favourable impact of aid on the level of human development 
among developing countries, but these social effects are conditional on the extent of democracy. 
Addison et al. (2005) and McGillivray (2000) postulated ambiguous results about the impact of 
aid on social public expenditures mainly in the provision of health and education services. 
Because aid is shown to increase public expenditures in social sectors but it is also shown to 
decrease tax revenues and increase public debt.  
 
Nourou (2014) concluded that foreign aid worsens social development, because first, aid tends to 
increase uncertainty and volatility in the recipient countries, which forces people to smooth their 
consumption levels by altering their health- and educational-related consumption expenditures. 
Second, the incurred substitution effects crowd out public expenditures on developmental goals.  
 
Foreign aid may also distort governance levels, according to Bräutigam and Knack (2004) due to 
the fragmentation and high transaction costs of multiple aid projects that are hardly handled by 
weak governments. This forces donors to manage their projects by setting independent units with 
their own budgets and implementation plans away from the regular bureaucracies. This, in turn, 
hinders the ability of these governments to learn new skills. In addition, aid can instigate 
inflation and cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which diminishes the profitability 
of tradable goods, causing ―Dutch disease‖ effects (Adam, 2005). 
 
A key assumption in the vast literature is that the growth and developmental effects of aid are 
uniform. We challenge this premise by questioning whether aid offered for one purpose, for 
example, political support, will have the same effect on economic development as aid spent on 
another, for example, education, social safety services, health clinics. In this research, we 
explicitly focus on aid channelled toward four sectors that provide essential prerequisites for a 
country to utilise and integrate its demographic capital. In other words, this is sectoral 
decomposed aid that is generally classified by Minoiu and Reddy (2008) as ―developmental aid‖. 
Figure 1 shows the sectoral decomposition of ODA to all developing countries during 1995–
2014. The largest share of ODA goes to the government and civil society sectors, while the 
lowest goes to other social infrastructure and services.  
 
The sectoral aid in our research is defined as aid allocated to, 1) total education (this includes 
basic education, secondary education, post-secondary education, teacher training, education 
policies, and facilities); 2) population policy and reproductive health (this includes population 
policies, reproductive health, and family planning); 3) other social infrastructure and services 
(this includes, welfare services, employment policy, housing policy, low-cost housing, and 
cultural and recreation); and 4) total production (this includes agricultural, fishery, forestry, 
mineral, industry, and construction). The share of ODA devoted to these four sectors represents 
around 28% of total ODA received by all developing countries.  
 
 
Figure 2: Disaggregated ODA to selected sectors from all donors to all developing countries 
(average 1995-2014) 
Notes: These flows are in a form of commitments, reported in US$ Millions in constant prices  
Source: (OECD, 2015) 
 
Table A1 reports selected developing countries from our sample and their conforming average 
levels of HDI, Heritage‘s economic freedom index, working age population during 1995–2014. 
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We observe that the majority of these countries are highly dependent on aid and have large 
stocks of working age population exceeding the world average of 60% of total population. Their 
economies are either repressed or mostly un-free, while their HDI exhibits that most of them are 
medium developed. 
 
3. Model specifications and data 
Since the introduction of the concept of human development in 1990 and the publication of the 
first Human Development Report (HDR) by the UNDP, HDI has become one of the commonly 
used measures of a country‘s development status (Anand and Sen, 2000). HDI intends to proxy 
three important dimensions of well-being: life expectancy represented by the dimension of a long 
and healthy life, the dimension of knowledge is represented by the indicator of education, and 
the dimension of income is proxied by per capita GNI
1
. Over the years, HDI was subject to 
major revisions until the most recent formula since 2010, which is expressed as the geometric 
mean of the component dimension indices: 
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where l is life expectancy at birth measured by life expectancy index, ε is an index of education, 
composed of two indices: mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling, and y is GNI 
per capita (PPP US$). Minimum and maximum values are used to create indices of 0 and 1. 
These values are the highest and lowest observed values in the time series (1980–2012). The 
minimum values for life expectancy are 10 years, with both education variables of 0 and 100$ 
for gross national income (GNI) per capita
2
.  
 
                                                             
1
 There have been a number of critiques of the HDI, this criticism and responses are reviewed by Raworth and 
 Stewart (2005).  
 
2
 HDI on various counts is not the same as GDP, especially in terms of adjustment and how it is affected by changes 
in the macroeconomic policies (Binder and Georgiadis, 2010). For detailed information about HDI calculation and 
data sources, see UNDP (2013). 
 
We use (hdi) as our dependent variable and fetch its data from the UNDP (2016). Our main 
independent variables are economic freedom index (eco) and aid. eco is sourced from Miller and 
Kim (2016) as a measure of the level of governance in the country, as well as the degree of 
freedom and flexibility of economic laws. While for aid, we start with an aggregate measure of 
net ODA to all sectors (aid). Then we use four disaggregated aid variables denoting 
―developmental aid‖, which is defined as aid channelled towards any of the following four 
sectors: total education (edu_aid), population policy & reproductive health (pop_aid), other 
social infrastructure and services (infra_aid), and total production (prod_aid). Data of these 
disaggregated variables are sourced from the OECD (2015). These data are reported in millions 
US$ (constant prices) and are in a form of commitments, not disbursements.  
 
Based on Masud and Yontcheva (2005) and Binder and Georgiadis (2010), we include a set of 
control variables that influence the country‘s level of development: a) rural development proxied 
by agricultural value added per worker as a percentage of GDP (rural); b) poverty headcount 
based on 1.90 US$ a day (poverty); c) trade openness measured as imports plus exports as a 
percentage of GDP (trade); d) Government expenditures on education and health as a percentage 
of total government expenditures (health) (education); e) the size of the working age population 
captured by the ratio of working age population to total population (working); f) rents measured 
by total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP (rents); g) inflows of remittances as a 
percentage of GDP (remittances); and h) net enrolment rate in secondary education as a percent 
of relevant age group (secondary). Data are sourced from the World Bank (2016). Variables‘ 
descriptive statistics and definitions appear in Tables A2 and A3. 
 
Our sample includes 139 developing economies based on the IMF classification
3
. It contains 17 
out of the 22 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. The MENA region is known to 
be the most youthful in the world with a median age of 22 years compared with a global average 
of 28 (Youth Policy, 2016). We include a dummy (MENA) and an interaction term between aid 
variables and MENA (aid*MENA) to capture whether the development impact of aid behaves 
differently in the MENA region compared with other world regions. We include a second 
                                                             
3
 The IMF uses a multidimensional classification system that considers (1) per capita income level, (2) export 
diversification (so oil exporters that have high per capita GDP are categorised as developing economies, because 
their exports are dominated by oil), and (3) degree of integration into the global financial system (IMF, 2016). 
interaction between the working age population and each of the aid variables (aid*working). To 
capture the effect of the working age population size on realising the development impact of aid, 
we write our equation in the form of the following ln-ln specfication: 
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where X is a set of control variables. The subscripts i denote the country (139 countries) and    is 
an error term. We estimate five equations using hdi as the dependent variable, while replacing 
aid with each of the sectoral disaggregated aid variables: edu_aid, pop_aid, infra_aid, and 
prod_aid.  
 
4-1. Methodology 
 
First, we estimate each equation individually using OLS, while using whites‘ cross-sectional 
clustered errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Then we take 
advantage of the heteroscedasticity nature of the error components that suggest that these 
equations are contemporaneously correlated, and re-estimate this system of equations jointly 
using SUR. The SUR estimator is more efficient than the OLS estimator, because it introduces 
information that exceeds that of considering each equation individually (Fiebig, 2001). In 
addition, using SUR fits the nature of our analysis that investigates the development of hdi across 
countries, while these countries are likely to be subject to spillovers from worldwide shocks 
(Creel and Farell, 1996). We test the existence of correlation among the equations‘ errors using 
the Bersuch Pargan test of heteroscedasticity. Rejection of the test null hypothesis reflects the 
statistical jointness of the equations (Table 1). 
 
Another concern is the reverse feedback from hdi on our key independent variable, namely aid, 
as HDI is one of the major determinants of foreign aid disbursements (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). 
One strategy for reducing the problem of reverse feedback is to use the lag of the right-hand side 
variables (RHS). The past values of foreign aid, economic freedom, and other control variables 
can affect the HDI at the current time but not vice versa (Bjorvatn and Farzanegan, 2015; Minoiu 
and Reddy, 2009; Farzanegan, 2014; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). Therefore, we regress the 
average of dependent variable hdi (2008-2014) over a deeper lag for all explanatory variables 
(1995–2008). The averaging methodology is also appropriate to account for slow-moving 
variables similar to hdi (Binder and Georgiadis, 2010; Bjorvaten and Farzanegan, 2013). 
 
Other concerns are collinearity and misspecification. We report Regression Specification Error 
(RESET) and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests of omitted variables and collinearity in Table 
1. Failure to reject RESET tests‘ null hypothesis implies that the equation is correctly specified 
(Ramsey, 1969). The correlation between predictors (collinearity) is a concern only when the 
mean of VIF is ≥10 (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
We use ln transformation to account for the presence of outlying observations and various 
measurement units in our dataset. Such strategy reduces the influence of outliers and converts 
possible existing non-linear relations into linear ones. Furthermore, it limits data variations over 
different magnitudes and measurement units via squeezing together the larger values and 
stretches out smaller ones (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
For heterogeneity and time-invariant country characteristics that are not captured in our cross 
section equations, we construct a panel dataset that contains 139 developing countries over 
1995–2014 and re-estimate our equations by using country fixed effects methodology in Tables 2 
and 3. According to Baltagi (2008), country fixed effects assist in controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity that is constant over time and correlated with independent variables. There are 
several time-invariant country characteristics that affect human development, which increase the 
risk of omitted variable bias, for example, geography, history, and other time-invariant 
determinants of human development. Moreover, fixed time effects capture shocks common to all 
countries such as global business-cycle effects (Bjorvatn, and Farzanegan, 2013). Furthermore, 
we use white cross-sectional clustered errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation.  
 
 
 
5- Results and discussion 
Table 1 reports OLS and SUR pooled cross-section regressions for 139 developing countries 
over 1995–2015. aid and the four sectoral disaggregated aid, edu_aid, pop_aid, infra_aid, and 
prod_aid are insignificant in explaining hdi developments across countries. The significant 
positive effect of eco is robust across all models. In Model 1.1, a 1% increase in eco increases 
hdi with 0.248% at 95% confidence level. This result is in line with common findings in 
development-related studies that the level of pursed governance and quality of institutions is an 
important catalyst for human prosperity (Miller and Kim, 2016).   
 
The two interactions in Models 1.11 and 1.12 are insignificant, which implies that the relation 
between aid and development is neither altered by the ratio of working age population in the 
recipient country nor with the inclusion of the MENA dummy. Both interactions have been 
tested with each of the four sectoral disaggregated aid variables but not reported. Nevertheless, 
their insignificant effects stay the same. Rural value added, working age population, and the rate 
of secondary school enrolment are the robust human development triggers among our control 
variables.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 report the panel fixed effects regressions. And in order to test the sensitivity of 
our results to the change of the dependent variable, we replace hdi with individual social 
variables that reflect advancements in the health and education sectors. We use infant mortality 
rate as a ratio of 1000 live births as a proxy for the quality of health services (mortality) in Table 
2. While for signalising the quality of education we use gross enrolment rate in tertiary education 
(tertiary) in Table 3
4
. Data are sourced from the World Bank (2016). We regress our new 
dependent variables over the full set of control variables while using cross-sectional clustered 
errors that are robust heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Only the key independent 
variables are reported in the Tables. We follow the ln-ln specification of our initial estimations.  
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 The international and regional PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS learning assessments provided by World Bank‘s education 
statistics would indeed make a better indicator for quality of education, but data on these tests are limited for our 
sample of developing countries to construct a panel dataset.   
 
After controlling for countries‘ heterogeneity, the results are similar to our cross-section 
regressions. All aid variables have no significant impact either on mortality rate or tertiary 
enrolment in Tables 2 and 3. Except Model 3.3 in Table 3, pop_aid has a significant positive 
sign, implying that aid channelled within the population sector tends to promote tertiary 
enrolment rate through its effect on reproductive health and family planning policies. This prior 
finding corresponds with the research line suggesting that aid fosters population growth rate via 
alleviating household‘s financial constraints of having more children (Azarnet, 2008). 
Correspondingly, more children are translated into larger demand for education, including 
tertiary education. We test the robustness of this result in Table A4 by regressing pop_aid over 
various indicators of primary and secondary enrolment rates, while using the same set of control 
variables in the initial estimation. Nevertheless, the significant coefficient of pop_aid does not 
seem to hold. The two interactions, aid*working and aid*MENA, are insignificant, which is 
similar to our initial estimations. Both interactions have been tested with each of the four sectoral 
disaggregated aid variables, but not reported
5
.  
 
                                                             
5 Results available upon request.  
Table 1 
OLS and SUR regressions 
The method of Ln-Ln estimation is OLS and SUR. The constant term is included (not reported). t statistics are shown in parenthesis are based on 
cross section clustered robust standardized errors. Significantly different from zero at *90%, **95%, and *** 99% confidence. lnhdi is averaged 
over 2008-2014, while explanatory variables are averaged over 1995-2008. Rejection of RESET test null hypothesis implies the absence of omitted 
variables bias. The low Mean VIF shows that the correlation among predictors is small and collinearity is not a problem in our calculations. 
Rejection of Bresuch-Pagan test null hypothesis shows that errors of the system of equations are correlated. 
    Dependent variable: Logarithm of  human development index    
 (1.1) 
OLS 
(1.2) 
SUR 
(1.3) 
OLS 
 
(1.4) 
SUR 
(1.5) 
OLS 
 
(1.6) 
SUR 
(1.7) 
OLS 
 
(1.8) 
SUR 
(1.9) 
OLS 
 
(1.10) 
SUR 
(1.11) 
OLS 
(1.12) 
OLS 
aid 
 
-0.007 
(-0.59) 
 
-0.000 
(-0.19) 
        -0.004 
(-0.37) 
0.339 
(0.65) 
edu_aid   -0.004 
(-0.35) 
-0.000 
(-0.34) 
        
pop_aid     -0.002 
(-0.23) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
      
infra_aid       -0.002 
(-0.15) 
-0.00 
(-0.08) 
    
prod_aid         -0.008 
(-0.98) 
-0.000 
(-0.20) 
  
eco 
 
0.248* 
(1.70) 
 
0.161** 
(2.01) 
0.240* 
(1.71) 
0.161** 
(2.06) 
0.240* 
(1.75) 
0.161** 
(2.03) 
0.242* 
(1.66) 
0.161** 
(2.04) 
0.267* 
(1.78) 
0.169** 
(2.05) 
0.281 
(1.63) 
0.245* 
(1.70) 
working 0.538** 
(2.34) 
0.345* 
(1.67) 
0.529** 
(2.34) 
0.345* 
(1.70) 
0.518** 
(2.39) 
0.344* 
(1.67) 
0.524** 
(2.48) 
0.345* 
(1.67) 
0.530** 
(2.46) 
0.345 
(1.68) 
0.537** 
(2.06) 
1.04 
(1.41) 
MENA*aid 
 
          -0.004 
(-0.18) 
 
working*aid            -0.084 
(-0.67) 
MENA           0.311 
(0.17) 
 
rural 0.351* 
(1.73) 
0.034** 
(2.33) 
0.037** 
(2.09) 
0.03** 
(2.35) 
0.037** 
(2.10) 
0.034** 
(2.33) 
0.038* 
(1.92) 
0.034** 
(2.33 
0.035* 
(1.96) 
0.034** 
(2.34) 
0.036* 
(1.64) 
0.034* 
(1.71) 
poverty -0.021* 
(-2.07) 
-0.018* 
(-1.73) 
-0.02** 
(-2.08) 
-0.018* 
(1.76) 
-0.02* 
(-1.88) 
-0.017* 
(-1.73) 
-0.020* 
(1.95) 
-0.017* 
(-1.73) 
-0.019* 
(1.96) 
-0.017* 
(-1.74) 
-0.020* 
(-1.83) 
-0.020** 
(-2.02) 
trade -0.011 
(-0.39) 
-0.007 
(-0.35) 
-0.009 
(-0.29) 
-0.008 
(-0.37) 
-0.004 
(-0.19) 
-0.007 
(-0.34) 
-0.006 
(-0.18) 
-0.007 
(-0.35) 
-0.010 
(-0.39) 
-0.007 
(-0.35) 
-0.003 
(-0.12) 
-0.008 
(-0.35) 
health -0.037 
(-1.17) 
-0.023 
(-0.89) 
-0.038 
(1.16) 
-0.023 
(-0.90) 
-0.035 
(-1.04) 
-0.022 
(-0.88) 
-0.035 
(-1.00) 
-0.02 
(-0.88) 
-0.038 
(-1.14) 
-0.023 
(-0.89) 
-0.404 
(-1.06) 
-0.404 
(-1.15) 
education 0.009 
(0.02) 
0.032 
(0.83) 
0.014 
(0.30) 
0.032 
(0.85) 
0.014 
(0.30) 
0.032 
(0.83) 
0.012 
(0.22) 
0.031 
(0.83) 
0.004 
(0.09) 
0.031 
(0.83) 
-0.001 
(-0.002) 
0.007 
(0.14) 
rents 0.015 
(1.28) 
0.012 
(1.24) 
0.014 
(1.31) 
0.012 
(1.25) 
0.014 
(1.37) 
0.012 
(1.24) 
0.014 
(1.27) 
0.012 
(1.24) 
0.014 
(1.34) 
0.012 
(1.24) 
0.012 
(1.17) 
0.012 
(1.17) 
remittances -0.002 
(-0.31) 
-0.008 
(-1.29) 
-0.003 
(-0.45) 
-0.008 
(-1.30) 
-0.003 
(-0.48) 
-0.008 
(-1.29) 
-0.003 
(-0.45) 
-0.008 
(-1.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.32) 
-0.008 
(-1.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.003 
(-0.40) 
secondary 0.230*** 
(6.89) 
0.216*** 
(5.39 
0.22*** 
(6.86) 
0.21*** 
(5.46) 
0.23*** 
(6.71) 
0.21*** 
(5.38) 
0.231*** 
(6.55) 
0.216*** 
(5.39) 
0.231*** 
(6.94) 
0.216*** 
(5.41) 
0.224*** 
(5.90) 
0.233*** 
(6.95) 
RESET (p-
value) 
(0.488)  (0.468)  (0.478)  (0.456)  (0.525)    
Mean VIF 2.36  2.31  2.29  2.46  2.28    
Bresuch-
pagan (p-
value) 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
Adj. R2 0.900 0.921 0.899 0.921 0.899 0.921 0.899 0.921 0.899 0.921 0.901 0.901 
Obs. 61 56 61 56 61 56 61 56 61 56 61 61 
Table 2 
Panel fixed effects regressions  
Dependent variable: Logarithm of mortality 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) 
aid 0.028 
(1.64) 
    0.219 
(0.36) 
0.009 
(0.63) 
edu_aid  0.003 
(0.33) 
     
pop_aid   0.002 
(0.41) 
    
infra_aid    0.012 
(1.03) 
   
prod_aid     0.008 
(0.70) 
  
working -3.224*** 
(-5.83) 
-3.073*** 
(-5.01) 
-3.15*** 
(-4.82) 
-3.483*** 
(-6.01) 
-3.014*** 
(-4.92) 
-3.07*** 
(5.10) 
-3.36*** 
(-6.05) 
eco 0.552*** 
(4.42) 
0.617*** 
(3.53) 
0.633*** 
(3.51) 
0.556*** 
(3.30) 
0.644*** 
(3.71) 
0.552*** 
(4.42) 
0.558*** 
(4.51) 
MENA       omitted 
 
MENA*aid       -0.030 
(-1.07) 
working*aid      0.215 
(0.712) 
 
 
CONTROL  YES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
Countries 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
R-sq (within) 0.852 0.829 0.830 0.843 0.832 0.836 0.836 
F statistic 
(Prob-value) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
The method of panel estimation is fixed effects (xtreg). The constant term is included (not reported). t statistics  
shown in parenthesis are based on cross section clustered robust standardized errors. Significantly different from 
zero at *90%, **95%, and *** 99% confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Panel fixed effects regression  
Dependent variable: Logarithm of tertiary 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7) 
aid 0.045 
(0.81) 
    -1.54 
(-0.86) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
edu_aid  0.136 
(0.38) 
     
pop_aid   0.069** 
(2.29) 
    
infra_aid    0.011 
(0.21) 
   
prod_aid     -0.046 
(-1.27) 
  
working 0.662 
(0.24) 
-1.297 
(-0.40) 
-0.148 
(-0.05) 
-1.40 
(-0.42) 
-2.09 
(-0.66) 
1.284 
(0.44) 
1.772 
(0.64) 
eco 0.087 
(0.21) 
1.112 
(1.58) 
0.976 
(1.45) 
1.14 
(1.63) 
1.004 
(1.46) 
0.087 
(0.21) 
-0.003 
(-0.01) 
MENA       omitted 
 
MENA*aid       2.450 
(1.70) 
working*aid      1.530 
(0.87) 
 
 
CONTROL YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Countries 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
R-sq (within) 0.672 0.646 0.718 0.644 0.665 0.679 0.672 
F statistic (Prob-
vlaue) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
The method of panel estimation is fixed effects (xtreg). The constant term is included (not reported). t statistics  
shown in parenthesis are based on cross section clustered robust standardized errors. Significantly different from 
zero at *90%, **95%, and *** 99% confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Countries are no different from individuals; those who are competent and self-sustaining are 
more likely able to confront challenges, invest in their aptitude, and stimulate intrinsic growth 
and development relative to others who rely on extrinsic sources of support and finance.  
Our research provides extra evidence against the development impact of foreign aid for our 
sample of 139 developing countries over the period from 1995 to 2014. We investigate the 
developmental impact of aid both aggregated and disaggregated to sectors that are essential for 
creating sound social and economic environments towards integration of these countries‘ 
demographic capital.  
 
Our cross-sectional ordinary least square and seemingly unrelated regression, as well panel fixed 
effect results show that foreign aid is a poor developmental tool, which is insignificant in 
influencing HDI or other individual social variables, like infant mortality and tertiary enrolment 
rates. Our results are robust for different model specification and the inclusion of different 
control variables. Our interaction term between aid variables and the ratio of working age 
population is insignificant in all our models, implying that the sluggish social effects of aid 
remain regardless of the level of working age population in the recipient country.  
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Appendix  
 A new blended system of aid disbursement 
  
There has been an intense debate in the literature over the reasons behind the loose 
developmental effects of foreign aid. Away from the straightforward reason that majority of aid 
flows follow political rather than development objectives (Kanbur et al., 1999). Further, several 
reasons have been introduced in the literature see for example (Radelet, 2008; Bräutigam and 
Knack, 2004, and others). However, these reasons can be condensed into two core causes, a) 
Lack of clear development agenda by the recipient countries which result in misallocation of aid 
and establishment of various simultaneous individual projects that even if successfully 
completed will have limited impact on the development of the target sectors; and b) The 
mismatch between donors, recipients, and target beneficiaries’ priorities and needs that create 
an aid system that is incapable and inadequate of achieving the entailed goals.  
 
In response to common pitfalls of the aid system, a new setting for aid disbursements based on 
sector-wide approaches instead of individual projects was introduced by Kamel, et al. (1998) and 
was later modified by (Kanbur, et al. 1999) and evolved into a system entitled the ‗common pool 
approach‘. Our following policy suggestions will build on these, however, we bring in some 
modifications for the system implementation and evaluation.  
 
The basic rationale behind the common pool approach is that a pool of donors—instead of one— 
allocates unconditional funds to a recipient country‘s nationally representative reform plan and 
its implementation strategy, instead of individual projects. Such a system would increase the 
recipient country‘s sense of ownership and commitment while enhancing the achievability of 
developmental and reform goals relative to individual uncoordinated projects approach. The 
major drawback is the minimisation of aid received because many donors – besides political 
lobbies and private sector firms – might not agree to fund national plans instead of individual 
selective projects. In addition, donors‘ ability to pursue their own interests, conditions, and 
opinions will dwindle. Anyhow, detailed discussion for the common pool system and sector-
wide approach is found in latter cited articles. Subsequently, we introduce a new system which 
combines both approaches, sector-wide and common pool, whilst including our personal 
reflections that will hopefully alleviate the expected drawbacks of these approaches.  
 
 Figure 3 provides a basic graphical representation of the new blended system. The graph is 
elaborated in the following points, 
 
a) The recipient country starts to move in the direction of prohibiting all forms of aid 
transferred to individual uncoordinated projects, but rather allows only aid channelled 
towards sectoral reform plans.  
 
b) The governmental authority with the cooperation of civil society, the private 
sector, policy makers, and citizens, formulate a reform plan for the target sector.  
 
c) A series of round table meetings are held in the recipient country capital that 
involves potential donors (single and multilateral), international experts, and other 
national parties in order to receive feedback on the preliminary proposal (sponsoring 
the meetings in the recipient country would ease national parties‘ involvement and 
cooperation, which reflects in a higher sense of belonging and ownership). 
 
d) A final neat version of the proposal is then reformulated along with its 
implementation strategy that involves foreign and domestic shares. For instance, 
technical and human resources in the implementation strategy are distributed as 70% 
domestic and 30% by the donor‘s side. One major drawback of the common pool 
approach is the lack of donor involvement in the implementation, which in essence is 
a good thing to increase the sense of ownership by the recipient. However, this is 
reflected in lower lobbying by the private sector and political parties in the donor 
country to step forward for similar approaches. We, therefore, propose a cooperative 
share of interests, however still managed and authorised by the domestic country and 
in the framework of the domestic strategy.  
 
e) The donor authority in this phase lies in accepting or rejecting the plan and the 
amount of fund provided, based on credibility and achievability of the plan.  
 
f) Donors together with the recipient responsible authority would agree on a set of 
quantifiable and measurable assessment measures that are monitored and reported by 
the authority itself, though donors are also allowed to intervene in the monitoring and 
evaluation of these measures. This is an incentive for the authority and other parties 
involved in the strategy to abide by the rules and the plan. Also, in the case of system 
corruption, which is the likely case in the majority of developing and poor countries, 
it is well known that foreign assessment might intervene anytime to inspect and 
evaluate. In addition, donors will be more relieved and secure when they have a hand 
in the evaluation process, unlike the common pool approach which prohibits any form 
of foreign intervention in the process unless requested by the recipient. 
 
g) Finally, a renewable annual funding plan is offered based on the realisation of 
these measures; failure to abide by the authority results in a violation of the contract. 
By doing this we eliminate any chances of aid misallocation, corruptive activities, and 
other illegal traits because the recipient knows for sure that failure will hinder any 
future possibilities of funding for other reform plans. Moreover, the ex-ante 
participation of civil society and citizens makes the government accountable to the 
public, which also affects their political popularity. 
 
Eventually, let me conclude with this phrase from Kanbur, et al. (1999) ―The possibility of the 
decline in aid will require a substantial amount of confidence on the part of recipients who adopt 
the approach. It requires a government with the willpower to say to donors: ‗Here is my program 
in this sector: if you wish to help me implement it, you are most welcome. If you wish to do 
something different, I regret that you are not welcome in this sector in this country.‖ The 
foremost outcome of the proposed blended system, common pool, and sector-wide approaches, is 
filtration of aid received as the recipient, by adopting these approaches, will be able to locate 
donors that endeavour no hidden, political, or ideological agendas but only support the recipient 
country‘s development efforts.  
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Figure A1: Graphical representation of the blended system of aid 
 Table A1 
Selected developing countries and their corresponding chosen indicators, average (1995-2013) 
 
Country  Working Age 
Population 
Aid Dependence Economic 
freedom 
HDI 
Bangladesh 62.3 High 50.0 0.54 
Kyrgyzstan 63.6 High 58.5 0.62 
Moldova 70.2 High 56.8 0.66 
Mongolia 67.1 High 59.8 0.68 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 62.0 Low 55.6 0.68 
Dominican Republic 61.9 High 62.9 0.69 
China 71.8 Low 52.75 0.71 
Algeria 66.5 Low 55.6 0.71 
Albania 65.8 High 58.9 0.71 
Tunisia 67.9 Low 58.8 0.72 
Armenia 67.3 High 68.6 0.72 
Ukraine 69.8 Low 49.7 0.73 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 68.7 Low 42.5 0.73 
Georgia 67.3 High 64.2 0.74 
Brazil 66.8 Low 59.2 0.74 
Mauritius 70.0 High 70.5 0.76 
Lebanon 66.5 High 58.6 0.76 
Panama 63.5 Low 66.1 0.76 
Malaysia 66.1 High 63.3 0.77 
Notes: According to Knack, (2001), we classify countries that have ODA (% GNI) above 4% or ODA (% 
government expenditures) above 15% as high aid dependence countries. For the economic freedom index, countries 
score of 50-59.9 are categorized as mostly unfree and countries score below 50 are categorized as repressed. HDI 
below 0.5 represent low developed countries, and a score between 0.5-0.79 represent medium developed countries.  
Source: Calculated by author from data provided by UNDP (2016), World Bank (2016) and Miller and Kim (2016).  
 
 
 Table A2 
Key variables‘ descriptive statistics  
 
 aid Edu_aid Infra_aid Pop_aid Prod_aid eco hdi 
Mean 5.780 3.364 2.545 2.090 3.257 3.980 -0.516 
Median 5.899 3.517 2.663 2.255 3.499 4.017 -0.444 
Maximum 8.594 6.098 6.222 5.743 6.473 4.328 -0.179 
Minimum 0.401 -1.319 -1.194 -4.268 -3.080 2.831 -1.119 
Std. Dev. 1.500 1.363 1.366 1.886 1.593 0.201 0.239 
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3 
Variables definition and sources 
Variable  Definition and sources 
aid Net aggregate ODA received as a percent of central government expense (OECD, 2015).  
 
edu_aid 
 
Education sector decomposed aid (reported in CRS as total education) reports ODA transferred by all donors via all channels reported in constant US$ prices of 2013 and in the form of 
commitments (according to CRS, this type of flows infer obligations on the recipient to perform a specific purpose during a predetermined period). Total education contains aid transferred 
for the advantage of all levels of education from primary to post-secondary education, as well vocational education, teacher training, and education policies (OECD, 2015). 
 
pop_aid 
 
Population policy and reproductive health aid (reported in CRS population policy and reproductive health) report ODA transferred by all donors via all channels reported in constant US$ 
prices of 2013 and in the form of commitments. This aid support reproductive health, and family planning policies (OECD, 2016). 
 
infra_aid 
 
Social infrastructure and services decomposed aid (reported in CRS as other social infrastructure and services) reports ODA transferred by all donors via all channels reported in constant 
US$ prices of 2013. Social infrastructure and services‘ aid finances social welfare services, employment laws, low-cost housing policies, and cultural and recreation policies (OECD, 2015). 
 
prod_aid 
 
Production sector decomposed aid (reported in CRS as total production) reports ODA transferred by all donors via all channels reported in constant US$ prices of 2013 and in the form of 
commitments Total production comprises aid transferred for the advantage of agricultural, fishery, forestry, industry, mining and construction sectors. These transfers finance various 
segments related to productivity enchantment techniques, services, training, research and development, exploitation and discovery (OECD, 2016). 
 
hdi  Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent 
standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. The index scale is from 0 to 1 (UNDP, 2016) 
 
eco Heritage‘s economic freedom index is based on 10 quantitative and qualitative factors, grouped into four broad categories, or pillars, of economic freedom: Rule of Law (property rights, 
freedom from corruption); Limited Government (fiscal freedom, government spending); Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom); and Open Markets 
(trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). A country‘s overall score is derived by averaging these ten economic freedoms, with equal weight being given to each on a scale  
from 0 to 100 (Miller and Kim, 2016) 
trade Sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP as an indication of the degree of the country‘s trade openness (World Bank, 2016). 
 
rural Agriculture value added per worker is a measure of agricultural productivity. Value added in agriculture measures the output of the agricultural sector that comprises value added from 
forestry, hunting, and fishing as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars (World Bank, 2016). 
 
poverty The percentage of the population living on less than $1.90 a day at 2005 international prices as a percent of total population (World Bank, 2016).  
 
education General government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. It includes expenditure funded by transfers from international sources to the government (World Bank, 2016). 
 
health Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditure. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family planning activities and nutrition 
activities but does not include the provision of water and sanitation (World Bank, 2016). 
 
secondary Gross enrollment ratio in secondary education is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group (World Bank, 2016). 
   
 
rents 
  
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents as a percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2016). 
 
 
remittances 
 
Personal remittances consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from nonresident households (World Bank, 2016).  
 
working 
 
Population ages 15 to 64 is the percentage of the total population that is in the age group 15 to 64 (World Bank, 2016) 
 . 
 
 
 
Table A4 
Panel fixed effects regressions of pop_aid over set of education indicators 
 
 
 
Dependent variables                         Ln gross primary                Ln primary completion          Ln gross secondary 
pop_aid 0.006 
(0.44) 
-0.011 
(-0.63) 
0.007 
(0.75) 
CONTROL YES YES YES 
R.sq-within 0.419 0.464 0.707 
Countries 139 139 139 
F statistic (Prob-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
